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ABSTRACT 
A new Product Liability (PL) Act in Japan became 
effective in July, 1995. In the United States, congress 
passed, subject to the endorsement of the president, the 
legislation that limits the ceiling of compensations and 
punitive damages in PL cases. Thus, there seems to be a 
converging tendency between the Japanese system, which has 
relative emphasis on industrial interests and encouraged off-
court settlements, and the U.S. system, which has relatively 
emphasized consumers' interest and encouraged litigation. A 
large difference exists between the United States and Japan, 
particularly in the number of suits about product liability. 
For example, within a half year after the enforcement of the 
new PL Act, only a single case was brought to court in Japan. 
This paper explains the legal content, the social 
background and the legislation process of the new PL Act in 
Japan. Using economic analysis, it clarifies the question of 
what the consequences are with the difference in legal systems 
on resource allocation in the two countries. 
March 1996 
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Koichi Hamada* 
1. Introduction 
On June 22nd, 1994, in the midst of the political turmoil 
that gave birth to the first cabinet to be headed by the 
Socialist Party in many years, the Product Liability Act (PL 
Act) passed Japan's Diet. The law became effective on July 
1st, 1995. This was the first time a special law to safeguard 
consumers against hazardous products had been enacted in 
Japan. This enactment was realized after more than twenty 
years of serious struggles among related parties, struggles 
that began when an advisory council in the Economic Planning 
Agency proposed the legislation of a Product Liability Law. 
Understandably, producers in the industrial sectors 
strongly opposed legislation of the PL Act. Until 1995, legal 
cases concerning defective products were handled by the 
application of traditional civil law, in particular Article 
709 on torts. Firms were afraid that the "liability crisis" 
or the "litigation explosion" in the United States might be 
imported to Japan. At the same time, in almost all developed 
*I am indebted to Messieurs Atsushi Kato (Economic Growth 
Center), Katsuhiko Masubuchi (JETRO NY) , Makoto Sakurai (Mitsui 
Marine Research Institute), Motoyoshi Snizui (Economic Planning 
Agency), and Minoru Tokumoto (Yale Law School) for valuable 
discussions and data. Also I thank Sunghyn Kim for his research 
assistance. 
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and developing countries and post socialist countries, 
including China, no-fault product liabilities were being 
introduced. Accordingly, Japan had begun to appear to be 
anachronistic in the field of product liability. The export 
expansion of Japanese goods that were produced under an easier 
PL standard could have been regarded by trade partners as 
social dumping. The new PL Act remedied this embarrassment 
or, at least, eased the situation. 
It is too early to assess the total impact of this epoch-
making legislation. As far as I know, however, there has been 
only a single court action related to the PL Act up to the 
present. In spite of the increased protection of consumers 
under the PL Act and all the media attention, the Japanese 
public has yet to change its attitudes toward defective 
products and, particularly, toward legal actions associated 
with them. 
The legislation of the PL Act was an important legal 
reform. It was also an economic reform since the study of 
product liability is one of the few areas in which law and 
economics interact very closely. This paper studies the 
economic implications of the new PL Act from a comparative 
perspective. 
The differences in existing PL laws, as well as the 
differences in their practical applications, in Japan and the 
United States indicate the characteristics of the two market 
economies and the societies. One observes the contrast 
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between a close-knit consensus-building society and an 
individualistic, litigious society. Japan puts priority on 
the relatively harmonious coordination of economic activities 
even at the risk of neglecting consumer interests. The United 
States emphasizes competitive and innovative activities. It 
puts priority on the protection of individual rights by due 
process, even though that is costly. 
A comparison of the substance of PL laws cannot be done 
properly without discussing differences in procedural law 
(Kobayashi, 1992). Thus, when I describe the impact of the 
introduction of the PL Act in Japan in a comparative 
perspective, I will also pay attention to the difference in 
procedures. This is the first point to be emphasized in this 
paper. 
The comparative effects of different PL laws and 
procedures, say the Japanese and the American, present an 
interesting question that can be answered by modern economic 
analysis. What affects the economic outcome of the product 
liability system is not only the strength of consumer 
protection in the substantive law but also the existence or 
non-existence of the contingent fee combined with the jury 
system. 
The legislation and application of PL laws has 
international implications in a world in which countries 
interact by trade, direct investment, and capital flows. The 
presence of rigorous PL law in the United States is probably 
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working to make Japanese exporters more cautious, even though 
they are accustomed to being shielded by the relative lack of 
PL suits from Japanese consumers at home. On the other hand, 
recent moves by the U.S. Congress seem to indicate that 
sentiment in favor of moving the extreme American PL system 
toward more reasonable ways of preventing defective products 
without cumulative legal costs. 
In this paper I give a short overview of the legal-
economic situation in Japan after the legislation of the PL 
Act in a comparative perspective with respect to the United 
States. Then I consider whether modern economic theory can 
give guidelines to evaluate and improve the present 
situations. 
In Section 2, I describe the basic features of the PL 
Act. Then in Section 3, I trace the responses of the actors 
in the Japanese scene: consumers, producers, insurance 
companies, lawyers, and the government. In Section 4, I 
analyze the economic implications of Japan's PL system by 
comparing them with the functioning of the more litigious U.S. 
system. Finally, in the last section I briefly mention the 
role of the PL system in the integrated world economy. 
2. Features of the New Product Liability Act 
The new Product Liability Act (Seizobutsu Sekinin Ho) 
passed the diet after a long tug-of-war period between 
consumers and lawyers on the one hand and producers on the 
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other. According to the new Act (PL act), the existence of a 
defect, the occurrence of damages, and the causality between 
the defect and the damages should be proven by the plaintiff. 
However, once the plaintiff proves these three factors, the 
existence of negligence and the causality between the 
negligence and the defect need not be proved by the plaintiff. 
In the process of legislating the PL Act, it was 
discussed whether the definition of a product should include 
non-tangibles such as computer software. The new PL Act 
limits the project to tangible objects. 
The PL Act allows the defendant to use a defense of 
"inevitable risks of technology development." Firms can make 
a plea insisting that, to the best of their scientific 
knowledge, they could not have known that they had produced a 
defective product. To encourage development of technology, 
medication and medical equipment, and to promote 
entrepreneurship of firms, proponents of this defense argued 
that the risks they cannot foresee at the time of development 
should be excused from product liabilities. Others who were 
opposed to this clause felt that it just gave firms more 
reasons to fight against plaintiffs, including those who were 
seriously injured or killed. 
In the absence of externalities with respect to knowledge 
and inventions, there is little reason from an economic 
standpoint to allow for this defense of development risks. 
However, as long as there are externalities in knowledge and 
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invention, as I believe is true, this clause can be justified 
at least in part by economic reasons. 
There has been an active debate about whether or not the 
presumption of the existence of defect, and the presumption of 
the causality between defects and damages on the part of 
victims should be incorporated in the new Act. It is argued 
that the detailed data, for example, of chemical, clinical, 
animal, and other experiments, are kept by the producers. 
Thus, by virtue of difficulty in obtaining data, the plaintiff 
has difficulty in proving the existence of a defect and the 
causality between the defect and the damage. 
I consider, however, that for many products consumers or 
users have better access to the relevant evidence. Some 
accidents take place because of the misuse of machinery, 
cosmetics, and so forth, and the person who can most easily 
provide evidence to the court is the person who is near the 
commodity at the time of the accident (i.e., the consumer, the 
user, or the victim). In this sense, the general approach of 
the PL Act may be sound. However, for some specific products 
such as pharmaceutical products, producers accumulate most of 
the crucial evidence regarding such things as defective 
medication that could cause health hazards. Without those 
physical, chemical, biological, experimental, and 
epidemiological data, the plaintiff would be in a difficult 
position to prove the defect and the causality between the 
defect and the damage. 
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Kato (1994) proposes that the PL Act should be amended in 
such a way that the court can, when needed, request firms to 
present evidence related to the defect and the causality. If 
the firms do not reveal sufficient evidence, then the court 
can decide that the firm has the burden of proof for the 
nonexistence of the defect and causality. This seems to be a 
persuasive argument provided that the revelation process does 
not turn into an expensive discovery process as is common in 
the United States. Again, the principle is that people who 
have closer access to evidence should bear the burden of 
proof. 
On the other side of the Pacific, attempts are being made 
in the United States to make PL laws for producers less 
stringent. The House of Representatives and the Senate, both 
of which are now under Republican majority, passed bills that 
would restrict the amount of product liability awards. The 
House bill intends to restrict punitive damages in all civil 
suits to $250,000 or three times the plaintiff's economic 
losses in all civil suits, to allow manufacturers of products 
to use the defense of having received Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) approval, and to shift the court fees to 
the party who loses the case. The Senate bill is more 
moderates and its main emphasis is to limit the punitive 
damages in product liability suits. 
Lawyers and consumer advocates like Ralph Nader strongly 
oppose these bills. And, the President is expected to veto 
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any strong measure of limiting the tort liability. 
Nevertheless, this move is a move, though very slight, of the 
American legal system toward a less expensive system of 
conflict resolution.1 This is an interesting contrast to the 
case of Japan where people are moving very slowly toward more 
protection of consumers' rights. 
3- Actors on the Scene of Product Liability 
Let us begin with a description of the characteristics of 
the main actors who interact with respect to the occurrence or 
the possible occurrence of defective products in Japan. 
3.1. Consumers 
In any society, consumer sovereignty is more myth than 
reality. Japan's consumers either willingly, reluctantly, or 
out of ignorance, to endure the extremely high price of rice 
and other agricultural commodities. Trade conflicts 
surrounding Japan could have been mitigated if Japan's 
consumers fully understood the merit of imports and expressed 
preferences for less expensive and more varied consumption 
-'•It is hard to obtain quantitative data in this field. 
People do not collect legal statistics as extensively as they do 
National Income Statistics. Business Week (September 26, 1994) 
reports that the lawyers gave $20 million to candidates in 
California, Texas, and Alabama alone. This may help to explain 
the success of lawyers who have repeatedly blocked moves to 
limit product liability laws. 
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bundles.2 
The influence of consumer organizations is modest, at 
best, and occasionally in the wrong direction. A consumer 
organization once petitioned the government not to relax the 
import ban of rice. These organizations consist mostly of 
women. The central organization, "Shufuren," means the 
housewife union, and it is often symbolized by a "rice 
scoop."3 
With respect to product liability and defective 
products, however, these organizations played an important 
role. Safety of the household is their utmost priority. 
Their objective is to punish morally the producers of 
defective products. They pay less attention to the balance 
among the amount of supply, the price of goods, and the 
incidence of accidents with respect to a household good. 
Scholars' concerns about consumers welfare is 
insufficient in Japan (for an exception, see Ito (1992)). 
Many treatises of anti-trust law, industrial law, and even 
intellectual property right law start with the assertion that 
2It is hard to find a "pure consumer" household because a 
household cannot consume unless it produces something. In the 
case of Japan's consumers, many of them have agricultural (or 
fishery) origins to which they return each summer and new year 
for their ancestral worship (Hamada and Nakajo, 1986). 
3At an OECD meeting on consumer issues I attended in the 
1980s, I remember that a representative of an American consumer 
organization asked a Japanese representative why Japanese 
consumer unions do not work hard to liberalize the import of 
rice and beef. It was as impressive as the fact that European 
delegates did not refer to the existence of agricultural 
subsidies. 
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these laws are for the benefit of industries, and do not 
explicitly mention the benefit of consumers. 
Recent data on the consciousness of consumers about the 
new PL Act are contained in an interview survey conducted by 
the Prime Minister's Office (Sorifu, 1994). Half a year after 
the enactment of the PL Act, that is, in December 1994, 32.4% 
of those interviewed knew about the PL Act, of these 12.0% 
knew the objective of the new Act. Sixty-five percent of the 
interviewed did not know about the PL Act. To the question 
whether they were interested in the PL Act, 56.4% answered 
"yes" and 41.5% answered "no" or "not so much." 
The most interesting finding in this survey is the 
question of how consumers' behavior will change because of the 
act. The answers chosen (multiple choice allowed) among 
alternatives were: 
(i) Choose the product paying more attention to safety 
in addition to price and quality: 29%, 
(ii) Use products more carefully and safely, for example, 
by reading the warnings on the products and the 
legends for use: 27.3%, 
(iii) When damaged by the accidents in products, bring 
forth complaints more actively: 25.7%, 
and 
(iv) Keep the product when damaged by accidents in order 
to investigate the cause: 19.7%. 
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Answers (i) and (ii) were more common among women. 
Answer (iii) was more common among the younger generation in 
the thirty-year old age bracket, which I found most 
interesting. In sum, 61.1% of individuals thought that 
consumer behavior would change and 33.7% thought that it would 
not. The latter answer was found more frequently among men. 
This lukewarm attitude — probably the more aggressive 
attitudes are found among the younger generations with respect 
to complaints — is symbolically presented by the lack of new 
suits in product liability. The Nikkei Newspaper reported on 
December 26, 1995, that a restaurant owner brought a court 
action against a producer of a paper container for tea. The 
container allegedly hurt his thumb when it was opened. The 
plaintiff's demand was the compensation of 910 thousand yen. 
This is probably the only court action after the new PL Act 
became that effective has been reported. 
In short, consumers are usually friendly rather than 
hostile with producers and government institutions. They are 
often uninformed or misinformed. They seldom bring a case 
into court. The new PL Act has hardly changed this situation 
and will change it only very slowly. 
3.2. Producers 
The Japanese economy is characterized by the firm-
dominated economy, or Kaisha-based economy. Under the 
lifetime employment system, which may be eroding only 
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extremely slowly in the face of continuing recession and the 
different attitude of younger generations, the firm is the 
most important entity in an employee's life, much more 
important than personal and family life. In fact, a firm is a 
quasi-family unit, where entertainment, excursions, parties, 
and kinds of (social) security care take place. The 
individual family life is often subordinated to the objective 
of the company. In fact, Kaisha (company) has a family 
structure by itself. In a sense, individual families belong 
to this big family, Kaisha. 
The strong tradition of Zaibatsu (family conglomerate, 
financial clique) or Keiretsu (firm group) maintains this 
organizational feature of Japan's production sectors. During 
the process of enactment of the PL Act, this strong tradition 
worked effectively to postpone the legislation despite 
pressures from consumers, lawyers, insurance companies and 
parts of the government.4 The international situation such as 
the initiation of the EC directive for product liability and 
the fear that Japan would be left behind made firms agree with 
the enactment of the PL Act. 
Large businesses were now ready to cope with the more 
organized system of quasi strict liability. They had started 
4It is generally believed that MITI (Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry) is the proponent of industrial 
interests and that the EPA (Economic Planning Agency) is the 
proponent of consumers. This kind of characterization is often 
too simplistic. Even within each ministry some sections support 
one side and some support the other side. 
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preparing for the new law even before it was legislated. 
Firms have made strong efforts to deal with complaints on 
their products. They hope that many complaints will be 
handled by consultations, mutual negotiations, and settlements 
rather than expensive legal processes. They can make use of 
product liability insurance. The defense of development risks 
will surely help the position of large firms that depend on 
modern technology. 
Corporations are eager to set up facilities of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). Home Electric Products 
PL Center, Automobile Product Liability Consulting Center, and 
Residential Construction Parts PL Center are examples of 
numerous organizations of this kind (Hayashida, 1995). In the 
corporate culture where suits are not welcomed, firms find it 
more convenient and comfortable to resolve conflicts through 
negotiations with claimants. Firms hope that the ADR system 
will work to seat claimants at the negotiating table rather 
than lead them to courts. Consumers can benefit from the 
speed of settlements. Lawyers in Japan, however, criticize 
these facilities because the process is not open, the 
discovery of evidence is imperfect, and precedents do not 
naturally exist. 
For small and medium companies (SMCs), say companies with 
fewer than 1000 employees, are in general more seriously 
affected by the PL Act. The defense of development risks is 
of limited value because SMCs do not necessarily use the 
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technology at the frontier of knowledge. Moreover, the burden 
of PL insurance can be heavy. Recently, insurance companies 
developed group insurance for SMCs. Companies join as a group 
to a pool for insurance whose payments to the insured may be 
limited by a certain amount. 
In the case of restaurants, for example, The Japan Food 
Hygiene Cooperative (Nihon Shokuhin Eisei Kyokai) pools 
premiums and makes contracts with the insurance companies. 
Thus restaurants that have to suspend business will be able to 
receive partial compensation. It is usually less expensive to 
be insured through the cooperative. Also insurance companies 
help in negotiations with consumers. In fiscal year (FY) 1993, 
about 70% of restaurants joined the cooperative (Hayashida, 
1995). 
Finally, under the Japanese PL Act, not only a natural 
person but also an incorporated person (a firm) can claim 
compensation for the damage. This adds to the concerns of 
parts producers in that they may be sued by firms that buy 
their products. 
3.3. Insurance Companies 
In Japan, liability insurance was first available in 1957 
(Hayashida, 1995). In FY 1992, the net insurance premium for 
the liability insurance of all the insurance companies in 
Japan amounted to 228 billion yen which is about 3.7% of the 
total net premium for all kinds of insurance. In FY 1993, the 
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net insurance premium for the liability insurance was 2 32 
billion yen and about 3.6% of the total net premium for all 
kinds of insurance. In FY 1994, the net insurance premium for 
the liability insurance of all the insurance companies in 
Japan was 243 billion yen and again about 3.6% of the total 
net premium for all kinds of insurance. Liability insurance 
does not necessarily cover all the insurance contracts related 
to product liability, nor do the figures in these years 
reflect the effect of the new PL law.5 However, these 
figures indicate that liability insurance has been increasing 
steadily although the amount of PL- related insurance in Japan 
has been relatively unimportant. A liability crisis is far 
from being a reality in Japan. 
The 228 billion yen in liability insurance premiums in 
1992 was about 0.04% of that year's GNP. It is difficult to 
sort out the premium corresponding to liability from the total 
causality insurance premium for the United States. According 
to one calculation by the EPA, the U.S. spent $16.3 billion on 
liability insurance in 1989, which is 7.8% of all the premiums 
received by causality and fire insurance companies. This was 
0.31% of the $5.25 trillion U.S. GNP (EPA, 1993). 
Insurance companies in Japan also play an important role 
in the propagation of knowledge about product liability. 
Yasuda Research Institute (1989) and Tokyo Kaijo Research 
50ne may argue that the steady increase implies that firms 
were preparing for the forthcoming legislation. 
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Institute (1994) are typical examples of such activities. 
More public consciousness will mean more business for them as 
well. 
3.4. Lawyers 
There is strong contrast in the number of lawyers in 
Japan and the United States. In 1993 there were 84,000 
lawyers in the United States, while in 1994 there were only 
18,400 lawyers in Japan, or roughly one twentieth. Even if we 
adjust for the size of populations, in the United States one 
lawyer serves 3 07 people and in Japan one lawyer serves 6,7 68 
people.6 
Of course, as Kato (1987) emphasizes, we have to compare 
the legal, social, and economic functions of lawyers rather 
than their mere numbers. For example, there is a large number 
of law undergraduates in Japan who do not enter the legal 
profession through the bar examination. Most of them are 
hired by firms as general employees or become public servants. 
A substantial number of these non-lawyers in Japan engage in 
legal activities that correspond to the activities of in-house 
lawyers in U.S. firms such as legal consulting and advisory 
activities. 
bThe corresponding figures of people per lawyer for European 
countries are larger than the United States — 684, 964, and 
1731 people respectively for the United Kingdom, Germany and 
France [Kubori, Hidaeki: Funso Shori no Infura, Shiho Kakuju 
Mattanashi (Fortify the Legal System for Conflict Resolution), 
Nikkei Business, January 1, 1996]. 
16 
Even though the number of lawyers is large in the U.S., 
the number of litigation lawyers is not so numerous. Around 
1985 the number of litigation lawyers was about 49,000. In 
Japan there were 18,000 lawyers, but most of them, except 
those who were judges or prosecutors, could work as litigation 
lawyers. Adjusting again for size of population, the density 
of litigation lawyers was higher in the United States but not 
very different (7 to 5) between the two countries (Kato, 
1987). 
The total number of court decisions in Japan on product 
liability cases during the postwar period is still extremely 
small, between 150 and 160. In the United States, 13,188 
cases in FY 1991 and 13,119 cases in FY 1992 were brought to 
court. This takes into account only those cases where the 
federal courts were involved.7 
Why is the number of law suits so small in Japan? The 
traditional explanation by Kawashima (1968) and others is that 
the Japanese do not regard legal actions to the court as 
socially desirable because the Japanese have a long tradition 
of respecting "harmony" among people. The first Constitution 
of Japan, established in the 7th century, starts with the 
phrase "Wa (harmony) is the most important." 
7According to the Quayle Committee's Report, which has the 
number of cases not only in the federal courts but in the state 
courts as well, in 1989 about 18 million cases existed in 
product liability, and, during that year, 250 thousand cases 
were accepted by the court. 
17 
This historical or cultural explanation has been 
challenged recently by alternative explanations. One 
explanation emphasizes the supply side of legal services. The 
supply of lawyers in Japan is limited by the national bar 
examination that is extremely competitive with a success rate 
of slightly less than two percent. Though somewhat relaxed in 
recent years, each year fewer than a thousand people are 
admitted as a pool for lawyers, prosecutors, and judges. 
One may suspect that some monopoly rent due to the 
restriction of the supply of lawyers emerges on the side of 
lawyers. The fact that American lawyers are eager to enter 
into Japan's legal services market, in spite of the opposition 
of Japan's Lawyers' Association, can be interpreted as the 
evidence of sufficient rent. 
The comparison of earnings of lawyers between Japan and 
the United States, however, does not completely support this 
supply limitation theory. This theory implies differences in 
the earnings of lawyers. However, earnings of lawyers are not 
conspicuously different. According to Kato (1987), the 
average or median earnings of Japanese lawyers in the early 
1980s were likely to be lower those of U.S. lawyers. Thus, it 
is not merely the shortage of lawyers, but some factors on the 
demand side, that make the number of suits small. 
One deterrent to litigation in Japan is the existence of 
high court fees and the absence of contingent fees for 
lawyers. According to Hayashida (1995), the court fee for a 
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plaintiff in the U.S. is constant regardless of the amount of 
the claim and is around $100, which an American attorney is 
willing to expend because of contingent fee system. In Japan, 
on the other hand, the amount of the fee is roughly 
proportional to the claim. For example, a claimant for 100 
million yen (= around $1 million) is required to pay 400 
thousand yen (= $4,000). (Kobayashi, 1995, has similar 
figures.) Moreover, Japanese attorneys have a standard fee 
schedule and do not rely on a contingent fee schedule. 
Hayashida (1995) mentions two other factors as deterrents to 
court actions in Japan: a complicated document is required to 
bring a case to court and the gloomy, dark atmosphere of court 
buildings gives a negative image to people. 
Another deterrent to litigation is the fact that court 
actions in the Japanese system can take a very long time; five 
years, on average, before judges' decisions are made (Haley, 
1991). Indeed, lawyers often do not encourage clients to 
bring issues to court; in fact they sometimes even discourage 
people from doing so, in great contrast to what "ambulance 
chasers" do. Thus, if the demand for legal service is not low 
because of Japan's culture, social organization, or the nature 
of its people, then it may actually be a result of actions 
taken by lawyers.8 
Even though the number of cases of product liability is 
8For the effects of the variability in award and the absence 
of the jury system, see Hamada (1995). 
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extremely small in Japan, the contrary is experienced in some 
serious cases of defective products. The public became 
seriously concerned with safety, particularly in the 1960s, 
when protests against polluting firms became vehement. There 
were many celebrated cases of product liability, such as the 
cases of Kanemi Oil, arsenic milk, SMON (subcate myelo-optico 
neuropathy), Chloroquine, and so forth. In the case of Kanemi 
Oil, a dangerous chemical normally used as a heat catalyst was 
mistakenly mixed with cooking oil. SMON was a disease 
triggered by an otherwise very effective drug for diarrhea and 
amebic dysentery, Cinoform. Chloroquine was a drug designed 
to fight Malaria, which caused many serious side effects and 
health hazards. 
Recently, the case of alleged fire from a Matsushita 
television attracted attention. The Osaka District Court 
decided that the fact that a TV caught fire would indicate the 
existence of negligence on the part of the producer. The 
Ministry of Welfare has been under fire because of the claim 
by plaintiffs who are victims of infected processed blood that 
the Ministry must have known about the danger of HIV infection 
from the blood processed without heated sterilization when it 
approved its import. Recently the Ministry acknowledged that 
it had known about the possibility. The case of the nutrition 
product, L-Triftophan, in the foreign market will be discussed 
later. 
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Let us consider some quantitative aspects of product 
hazards in Japan. The National Life Center and its 
perfectural branches, Consumer Life Centers, indicate that 
they receive complaints regarding defective products that 
amount in value to 1.585 million yen. Japanese consumers are 
quite reluctant to complain to an official center. They 
estimate accordingly, that only 2 percent of them complain. 
There are also other institutions that accept complaints, but 
suppose, accordingly, that 60% of those who do complain go to 
the Consumer Life Centers. A report of the Economic Planning 
Agency (EPA) on product liability calculates that 1.585/(0.02 
x 0.6) = 1.585/(0.012) million yen = ¥132 billion was involved 
in the damages caused by defective products and was hidden 
from statistics. Based on the exchange rate at that time, 
about $1.1 billion were at stake. 
The cost of food poisoning, which includes the causality 
from dangerous blow fish (fugu) , was calculated as being about 
¥4 billion. Damages from fire were ¥1.4 billion and those 
from defective automobiles were estimated to be ¥11.4 billion. 
These numbers total about ¥150 billion, or, at an exchange 
conversion rate of 120 yen per dollar, approximately $1.3 
billion in damages. 150 billion yen is about 0.03% of GDP. 
In the Kanemi Oil case, the maximum awards to plaintiffs 
was 6.3 billion yen, but these awards were given to tens of 
plaintiffs. In the United States, the total compensation for 
the asbestos-related cases allegedly amounted to $20.9 
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billion. 
The extent of payments to lawyers is usually considered 
to be 1/3 to 35% of the award by the court. In Japan it is 
certainly less, close to 8 to 10% of the awards. Accordingly, 
the flow of income to the legal profession associated with PL 
disputes in Japan has been much smaller than that to U.S. 
lawyers. 
In summary, the ratio of the per capita number of lawyers 
is one to twenty between Japan and the United States, the 
number of cases brought to court is one to more than one 
hundred, and the per capita GNP amount of money involved 
through the insurance system for product liability is at least 
one to ten in terms of insurance premia.9 
The costs incurred by legal processes in both countries 
are hard to access precisely. So are the costs for consumers 
who cannot recover their damages. We need further empirical 
research to find the basic quantitative evidence to decide 
which of the two systems is more tolerable even though both 
are the second best. 
Legal services are utilized to decide how to cut the pie, 
but by themselves they do not enlarge the pie. One may deduce 
9Estimates vary. Business Week (December 4, 1995) cites a 
study by Tillinghast-Towers Perrin which indicates that the 
legal and administrative, jury and settlement costs related to 
tort amount to 2.2% of the U.S. GDP, while in Japan this cost is 
about 0.5%. The U.S. figure hit a peak in 1985 at 2.5%, and 
accordingly, it is decreasing, but is still higher than other 
industrial countries. (The ratio is 1.3 in Italy and Germany, 
0.8% in the UK, France and Canada.) 
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conventionally that a large flow of resources into legal 
activities is not welcomed. For some people, of course, it 
has a value of its own to appeal to a court and to be awarded 
proper compensation. The American people, however, seem to 
spend too much on dispute resolution with respect to product 
liability. 
3.5. Government 
The Division of Human Life of the Economic Planning 
Agency was instrumental in proposing, advocating, and drafting 
the new PL Act. It had organized a large number of meetings 
and published the proceedings of these meetings since the idea 
of legislating a PL law was initiated. Other government 
offices like the Industrial Structure Section of the Ministry 
of the International Trade and Industry also participated in 
the process. 
The Japanese government does not encourage court actions, 
but does encourage consumers to be well informed about the 
nature and the possible danger of a product. The National 
Life Center was established to collect information of 
dangerous products, to test the safety of products, and to 
train specialists on consumer affairs. It is associated with 
more than 2 60 Consumption Life Centers. In its bulletin dated 
July, 1994, the Center expressed its strong intention to help 
consumers by providing counseling to them, publicizing 
information, and assisting lawyers who bring suits to court. 
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Hayashida (1995) describes this bulletin as "frightening" to 
manufacturers. 
Also, many ministries have opened offices for handling 
consumers' claims: for example, the Ministry of Welfare for 
medication, the MITI for manufactured products, and the 
Ministry of Agriculture for food. Municipal governments are 
following the lead of the national government. 
4. Economic Analysis 
Let us turn to the economic analysis of product 
liability. (For a comprehensive synthesis, see Schwartz 
1988.) Start from the simplest case where a product, say 
bottled beer, may cause damage without a safety measure 
(Demsetz (1972), Hamada (1976), and, in the context of labor 
accident compensation, Williamson et al. (1967)). If the 
producer spends some additional money on the product, the 
damage can be prevented. This assumption can be relaxed 
without difficulty. We shall assume that the expected value 
of the damage does not depend on the level of consumers' care. 
Suppose the consumers consist of individuals and their 
marginal utility of income can be regarded as constant. 
Accordingly, they are risk neutral, but we are allowed to use 
the partial equilibrium framework. 
In Figure 1 let DD be the demand curve for a product on 
the condition that it is perfectly safe, and let SS be the 
supply curve of the product without expenditure on the safety 
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measure. Under the validity of the partial equilibrium 
analysis, the social gain is expressed by the social surplus, 
that is, the sum of the consumers' and producers' surplus. 
The maximum social surplus in the absence of product hazards 
is realized as the area of the triangle DPS in the competitive 
market, OP' being the competitive price. 
Now let us introduce the danger from the product. If the 
expected value of the damage of explosion is DD*, the demand 
curve for the unsafe product becomes D*D* if the consumers 
know exactly the probability of damage. Also let SS* be the 
cost of the safety measure for the product, so that S*S* is 
the supply curve of the safe product inclusive of the 
expenditure on the safety measure. 
If the producers are liable, they will compare the 
expected value of the compensation with the cost for 
implementing the safety measure. Figure 1 is drawn in such a 
way that SS* is smaller than DD*. Accordingly, the economic 
calculation of the producers lets them implement the safety 
measure in this case because the producers' surplus is larger 
with the safety measure. Thus equilibrium R is realized, OR' 
being the price. 
If the consumers are liable, as long as the consumers are 
perfectly aware of the probability and the magnitude of the 
damage, DD shifts to D*D*. Accordingly, it is more profitable 
for the producers to produce the safe product because the 
producers' surplus S*RR' with the safe product, is larger than 
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SQQ' with the unsafe product. Thus R is realized in this case 
as well. Similarly, if SS* were larger than DD*, the 
equilibrium corresponding to Q in Figure 1 would be chosen 
regardless of which party would be liable for the damage. 
Thus, regardless of the liability rule, and even in the 
absence of explicit negotiations, the competitive market 
realizes the maximization of the total surplus, provided that 
the victims are limited to the purchasers of the product, and 
that the consumers are fully aware of the expected cost of the 
danger. The direct or indirect price relationship between 
producers and consumers enables them to engage in implicit 
negotiations by imputing the burden of risk through the price. 
Moreover, the distribution between consumers' surplus and 
producers' surplus remains the same as long as the equilibrium 
is given by R. Thus the liability rule affects neither 
resource allocation nor income distribution. This 
invariability of income distribution with respect to the 
liability rule is contrasted with the case of tort in general, 
where the Coase Theorem gives the invariability of resource 
allocation but not that of income distribution. 
Neither the resource allocation nor the distribution 
between the consumers' and the producers' surplus is affected 
by the liability rule, provided that the consumers are fully 
aware of the probability and magnitude of the damage due to 
the product hazard, and that the victims are limited to the 
purchasers of the product. This is the starting point of our 
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analysis. 
In the real world, consumers are not expected to know 
every possibility for a defect of a product. If consumers are 
liable, or if they cannot recover for damages caused by a 
product, then producers are induced to produce an unsafe 
product. Consumers who had the misconception that the product 
is safe will buy the product and be harmed by its defect. 
Figure 2 depicts the extreme case in which all the 
consumers are ignorant about the possible defect of the 
product. If the expected value of the damage is equal to DD*, 
the market price will be determined at P and consumers will 
suffer the damage equal to the area of the shaded region. In 
the presence of misperception, the above neutrality theorem 
does not hold, and consumers lose the amount equal to the 
shaded area of DPVD*. Strict liability improves this 
situation, because all the burden of consumers is shifted to 
producers. Producers behave as if they were facing demand 
curve D*D* of consumers, and accordingly choose R as the 
equilibrium output. 
To make the situation more realistic, suppose some of the 
consumers discern the possible danger, and the rest of them do 
not. Then the effective demand curve for the consumers as a 
whole can be drawn as curve DXD** in Figure 3. (Here it is 
assumed that half the consumers are ignorant. The demand 
curve is constructed by adding the demand curve starting at D, 
for the half of the population which recognizes, to the demand 
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curve starting at D*, for the other half of the population 
which does not.) Here a liability rule that does not make 
producers liable can lead to misallocation of resources. In 
this example where SS* is larger than DD*, producers do not 
choose to adopt the safety device. 
Thus, in the presence of misperception and in the absence 
of legal costs, the producer's liability is better for 
resource allocation. If one introduces the aspects of legal 
costs, settlement costs, and attorneys' costs, the situation 
will again become more complicated. 
Let us return to the world in which all of the consumers 
misconceive a product to be perfectly safe in spite of the 
danger. Because of the existence of misconception, the system 
of producer's liability is chosen. Consumers are surprised by 
the accident and we assume that they bring the case to court. 
As mentioned above, in the United States consumers pay only a 
nominal part of legal costs due to low court fees and the 
existence of the contingent fee system. Let us assume that 
producers pay all the legal costs, and that all consumers 
actually sue the producer after the accident. Then, as in 
Figure 4, the amount of damage DD* will be shifted to 
producers as ST-^. The legal cost that is imposed on producers 
is expressed as the distance T1T2» If the prevention cost on 
the part of producers is small and like s\s\, then producers 
are motivated to adopt the safety device and the market will 
determine the price of the product at J?1# There will be no 
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need for legal processes and the magnitude of legal costs does 
not matter to resource allocation. 
If the cost of adopting a safety measure is as expensive 
as OS2, however, legal cost matters much in deciding whether 
to adopt safety measures. If the cost of prevention curve 
S2S2 curve goes above T2T2 curve, then producers will give up 
improving safety. Therefore accidents occur, and the market 
equilibrium is attained at Q. The economy will "lose" the 
shaded area, T2QLT1 as the legal cost of negotiations, 
settlements and trials.10 If S2S2 lies between T1T1 and T2T2, 
one can easily see that the prevention measure will be adopted 
but that is not socially optimal. Producers overprotect 
because of the burdens of legal cost on them. 
Thus the following dilemma emerges. In spite of the 
necessity for producers to have the liability when consumers 
misconception occurs, a large legal cost has the following 
production implication. It makes producers spend more than 
necessary for prevention, and reduce or suspend production or 
services more than the desirable resource allocation requires. 
In other words, the resources put into conflict resolution 
are, in a sense, wasted. 
Firms rely on insurance to protect themselves from paying 
a large amount of the jury award that implicitly contains the 
legal cost of a PL case. Although insurance is a necessary 
10If the legal profession creates the services of providing 
the feeling of fulfillment of clients' intentions or fulfillment 
of justice, then this may not be a loss. 
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and useful device for pooling risks, it may create problems 
such as moral hazard and adverse selection. In particular, 
firms that have already paid insurance premiums may not spend 
on the safety improvements. In this case, the economic 
incentive described above will cease to work (moral hazard). 
Producers charge a high price for their product to cover their 
insurance premium, and that may harm the poor buyers rather 
than the rich buyers (Priest, 1987). Moreover, the firm may 
stop producing the product if the cost of insurance is too 
high. ST2 is too large to produce a good (service)! Casual 
evidence suggests that the insurance premium a Japanese 
medical practitioner pays is about one or two per cent of what 
an American doctor pays. Because of the high insurance 
premiums, doctors are said to avoid clinical practice in a 
field like obstetrics. 
A large jury award certainly benefits the plaintiff of 
the case but, as a result, most consumers will lose by facing 
higher prices. The switching of the burden of court fees to 
plaintiffs who lose may reduce legal costs in the case of 
misconception. If consumers are fully aware of the damages 
and expected court fees that are needed to recover the 
damages, then those expected costs it will be reflected in the 
demand curve. Again the neutrality theorem along the line of 
the Coase will prevail. The court fee assigned to consumers 
will be reflected in a higher price of the commodity. If 
consumers are not fully aware of the possibility, then it will 
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help by reducing the expected costs to producers. The same 
applies to the maximum limit of award currently discussed in 
the U.S. Congress. It will certainly reduce the burden to 
producers and accordingly mitigate the dilemma mentioned 
above. 
The jury is often said to determine the jury award such 
that the award net of attorney's fees should equal the amount 
of damages (Kobayashi, 1995; EPA, 1993). Then the expected 
cost that the defendant pays will include the attorney's fees 
as well. It can be shown, under the assumption of the free 
entry of lawyers, that the defendant will pay the sum of 
damage D and the capitalized value of I/n where I is the 
attorney's fixed cost for pursuing the suit, and w is the 
probability of winning the award.11 
The Japanese system tends to encourage production and new 
development of goods. But legal incentives to stop defective 
products are not sufficient. Many consumers have been, and 
continue to be, compelled to endure the consequences of 
defective products without being compensated either because of 
the lack of information or because of the lack of 
opportunities to protest — in particular, to appeal to a 
court. 
Legal costs certainly change the resource allocation and 
income distribution. Honoring the waiver clause on the 
product by which consumers' give up claims will make the 
natural selection possible. In other words, the device in 
which producers put waiver clauses of the compensation and 
sell cheap products will work as a means of attaining Coase 
type of solutions. 
One direction that Japan's government emphasizes is to 
make consumers aware both of the possibility of defective 
products and of possible ways of recovering damages including, 
but not necessarily confined to, court actions. Reducing the 
gap between D*D* and the uninformed demand curve DXD**, is 
certainly a promising direction. 
One puzzle is the phenomenon that Japanese firms are 
committed to safe and high-quality products in spite of 
Japan's less strict product liability law. Probably one 
reason for this is the existence of trade with more strict PL 
countries, as will be explained in the last section. Another 
reason is peer pressure. Defective products create social 
issues; reputation is often more important than economic 
calculation. 
There must be a combination of incentive schemes that 
guarantees the best outcome. Probably the best system lies 
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between the Japanese and the American system. Easier 
opportunities for the consumers to protest and allowance of 
easier opportunities for attorneys to pursue the PL litigation 
than in Japan will improve the incentives of producers to 
improve safety and prevent consumers from being to accept the 
damage or firms' conditions of settlements. But probably the 
best system will not be the adoption of punitive damages nor 
that of the jury system. The American system seems to be a 
little biased toward the excessive use of legal procedures and 
the excessive incentives for producers to prepare for the 
damage. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
If we compare any two or more systems, we seldom find 
that one system dominates others. Most of the systems have 
advantages as well as disadvantages. We have found that the 
Japanese legal system tends to economize legal and 
administration costs related to defective products even at the 
cost of uncompensated consumers, and that the U.S. tort system 
tends to compensate consumers at the cost of large legal and 
administration costs which result in higher commodity prices. 
Both systems are now slightly converging with each other. 
The new PL Act will make Japan's consumers more protected, 
even though the evidence is yet to come. The bills that 
passed the U.S. Congress, if the essential content of them is 
really implemented, will make American product liability less 
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expensive. These laws appear to be looking in the same 
direction, but from very different starting points. 
There are two kinds of important costs that usually move 
in mutually different directions in these reforms of product 
liability. The first is the cost of consumers' loss due to 
their ignorance or misconception of dangers of a product. For 
those who attach importance to the fact that a victim has the 
choice to appeal to due process of law and to be judged fairly 
regardless of the decision, this first cost is even more 
important. The second is the cost involved in the legal 
process such as discoveries, settlements, and trials. 
Japan's new PL Act aims to reduce the first kind of cost, 
while U.S. moves to limit awards for product liability claims 
show the way to moderate the second kind of cost. Indeed, 
Japan's direction is a structural reform. It does not 
necessarily mean deregulation because a firm is under a 
stricter rule of conduct with respect to defective products. 
However, it should be noted that the attempt to reduce the 
economic cost of accidents by the behavior of private agents 
such as consumers and producers under a given rule of product 
liability is certainly a market solution to product hazard. 
Then, how far should Japan's legal system approach the 
U.S. type of system. Consumers should be protected as much as 
reasonably possible. At the same time, however, the 
deadweight loss of legal or settlement costs should not be 
increased without a proper limit. Unless the present system 
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does not create many consumer victims out of ignorance, I am 
inclined to think that Japan's system does not need to be 
strengthened to approach genuine product liability. But this 
is surely a matter for serious debate. 
No legal system stands alone. The system functions only 
if it is supported by economic and social systems on which the 
legal system operates. Therefore, it would be hard to create 
an average of the American and Japanese systems. The direct 
grafting of the stem of one system into the other is 
difficult. A more practical way is to adapt a part of the 
existing system by the wisdom we obtain from the other system. 
In that sense, the movements in the two countries are welcome. 
Even without grafting or harmonizing the systems, trade 
and foreign investments make the handling of defective 
products quite different from that of the closed economy. 
Presumably, one would say, Japanese firms would have 
advantages in their exports because they are not induced to 
spend as much on the prevention of accidents or on legal 
costs. American firms have to spend much on legal costs. 
Suppose these statements are true. Even then, Japanese firms 
have to meet the high American standards and the court costs 
in the United States under free trade. This will give 
stronger incentives for Japanese firms to improve the safety 
of their products. Similarly, American firms will face a 
little less stringent requirement. In sum, international 
trade will mitigate the systemic differences in product 
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liability. 
This factor may explain the puzzle that Japanese 
products, though they are under less rigorous product 
liability, seem to keep high quality. The possibility of 
being tested in foreign markets where the PL law is better 
organized may be one of the reasons Japanese products have a 
high safety standard. This is a good explanation, but it may 
not be enough. One other important reason would be the peer 
pressure in the industrial circle. In the Japanese tradition, 
the firm's name is like the authentic family name. Selling a 
defective product with your brand is like disgracing your 
brand name, or your family name. Is it my prejudice to say 
that this kind of business psychology helps firms to continue 
to produce safe products in Japan? 
The strength and weakness of the American and Japanese 
systems also have implications for bilateral and multilateral 
international negotiations. In the talks concerning non-trade 
barriers between countries, or those concerning the new 
international rule, the negotiation is centered around 
legislation or an amendment of a law in the other country or 
the international law. The treatment of the subordinate right 
of copyright is one example. 
The fact that negotiators on the U.S. side are extremely 
capable attorneys gives me some concern. They seem to prefer, 
partly due to the instinct of attorneys, more and more 
litigious methods of conflict resolution. I hope that they do 
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not always insist on and succeed in imposing a highly 
litigious system that has developed in the United States. 
For, if they do, they might as well export the highly 
expensive cost of the American system of conflict resolution, 
which probably outweighs its benefit. 
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APPENDIX I 
The Product Liability Law (Law No. 85, 1994) 
(tentative translation) 
Article 1 [Purpose] 
The purpose of this law is to relieve the inured person by 
setting forth liability of the manufacturer, etc. for damages 
when the injury on a life, a body, or property is caused by a 
defect in the product, and thereby to contribute to the 
stabilization and improvement of the people's life and to the 
sound development of the national economy. 
Article 2 [Definitions] 
(1) As used in this Law, the term "product" means 
movable property manufactured or processed. 
(2) As used in this Law, the term "defect" means lack of 
safety that the product ordinarily should provide, 
taking into account the nature of the product, the 
ordinarily foreseeable manner of use of the product, 
the time when the manufacturer, etc. delivered the 
product, and other circumstances concerning the 
product. 
(3) As used in this Law, the term "manufacturer, etc." 
means any one of the following: 
1. any person who manufactured, processed, or 
imported the product as business (hereinafter 
called just "manufacturer"); 
2. any person who, by putting his name, trade 
name, trade mark or other feature 
(hereinafter called "representation of name, 
etc.") on the product presents himself as 
its manufacturer, or any person who puts the 
representation of name, etc. on the product 
in a manner mistakable for the manufacturer; 
3. apart from any person mentioned in the 
preceding subsections, any person who, by 
putting the representation of name, etc. on 
the product, may be recognized as its 
manufacturer-in-fact, in the light of a 
manner concerning manufacturing, processing, 
importation or sales, and other 
circumstances. 
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Article 3 [Product Liability] 
The manufacturer, etc. shall be liable for damages caused by 
the injury, when he injured someone's life, body or property 
by the defect in his delivered product which he manufactured, 
processed, imported or put the representation of name, etc. as 
described in subsection 2 or 3 of section 3 of Article 2 on. 
However, the manufacturer, etc. is not liable when only the 
defective product itself is damaged. 
Article 4 [Exemptions] 
In cases where Article 3 applies, the manufacturer, etc. shall 
not be liable as a result of Article 3 if he proves; 
1. that the state of scientific or technical knowledge 
at the time when the manufacturer, etc. delivered 
the product was not such as to enable the existence 
of the defect in the product to be discovered; or 
2. in the case where the product is used as a component 
or raw material of another product, that the defect 
is substantially attributable to compliance with the 
instruction concerning the specifications given by 
the manufacturer of the said another product, and 
that the manufacturer, etc. is not negligent on 
occurrence of the defect. 
Article 5 [Time Limitations] 
(1) The right for damages provided in Article 3 shall be 
extinguished by prescription if the inured person or 
his legal representative does not exercise such 
right within 3 years from the time when he becomes 
aware of the damage and the liable party for the 
damage. The same shall also apply upon the expiry 
of a period of 10 years from the time when the 
manufacturer, etc. delivered the product. 
(2) The period in the latter sentence of section 1 of 
this Article shall be calculated from the time when 
the damage arises, where such damage is caused by 
the substances which are harmful to human health 
when they remain or accumulate in the body, or where 
the symptoms for such damage appear after a certain 
latent period. 
Article 6 [Application of Civil Code] 
In so far as this law does not provide otherwise, the 
liability of the manufacturer, etc. for damages caused by a 
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defect in the product shall be subject to the provisions of 
the Civil Code (Law No. 89, 1896). 
Supplementary Provisions 
1. Enforcement Date, etc. 
This Law shall come into force the day after one 
year from the date of promulgation, and shall apply 
to the products delivered by the manufacturer, etc. 
after this Law comes into force. 
2. Partial Amendment of the Law on Compensation for 
Nuclear Damage 
The Law on Compensation for Nuclear Damage (Law No. 
147, 1961) shall be partially amended as follows: 
In section 3 of Article 4 of that Law, "and the Law 
relating to the Limitation of the Liability of 
shipowners (Law No. 94, 1975)" shall be amended as, 
"the Law relating to the Limitation of the Liability 
of shipowners (Law No. 94, 1975) and the Product 
Liability Law (Law No. 85, 1994)". 
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